

## Approved For Release 2006/09/25: CIA-RDP80B01554R003400130029-4

7 MAR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Strategic Programs

Chief, SALT Support Staff

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

White Paper on Verification; NIE 11-3/8

- 1. Thanks to you, Ray, for the memo of 27 February on ACDA's white paper on verification. I'm very grateful that you alerted us and then negotiated the appropriate changes to that statement. I agree that we can live with it. I request that you now prepare for me a special notebook for SALT verification purposes. I think we should take all of the data on the present scorecard and all of the topics listed in this verification statement which are not covered on the scorecard and have a section that would discuss each one in the following categories:
  - a. What the Soviets now have, what Soviet development or modification programs are under way with respect to each area;
  - b. What our monitoring is dependent upon today by percentage;

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3. Beyond this, I would like to sit down with you, Howard, in the near future and talk about what work you are doing now on NIE 11-3/8. I am quite interested in our continuing to pursue the methodology of that estimate. It seems to me we now need to look at doing some sensitivity checks. What if they do put Backfire to a maximum intercontinental use? What other changes would most affect the results, e.g., improved accuracy? Finally, I think we should also look at it from the Soviet point of view. How is the Howard Stoertz of the Soviet Union likely to view such a study? Would he make the same assumptions for the Soviet Union that we do?

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cc: D/NFAC